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ABSTRACT
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 2.0 provides a two-phase key exchange primitive
which can be used to implement three widely-standardized authenticated key exchange protocols:
the Full Unified Model, the Full MQV, and the SM2 key exchange protocols. However, vulnera-
bilities have been found in all of these protocols. Fortunately, it seems that the protections offered
by TPM chips can mitigate these vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present a security model which
captures TPM’s protections on keys and protocols’ computation environments and in which multi-
ple protocols can be analyzed in a unified way. Based on the unified security model, we give the
first formal security analysis of the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0, and the analysis results
show that, with the help of hardware protections of TPM chips, the key exchange primitive indeed
satisfies the well-defined security property of our security model, but unfortunately under some im-
practical limiting conditions, which would prevent the application of the key exchange primitive in
real-world networks. To make TPM 2.0 applicable to real-world networks, we present a revision of
the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0, which can be secure without the limiting conditions. We
give a rigorous analysis of our revision, and the results show that our revision achieves not only the
basic security property of modern AKE security models but also some further security properties.
Keywords Authenticated Key Exchange · Security Analysis · TPM 2.0
1 Introduction
The TPM, presented by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), is widely available in modern PCs and laptops, and is
used to enhance the security of modern operating systems: the Linux kernel integrity subsystem leverages the TPM
to store integrity measurements of software and attest to remote entities; Windows adds many security features based
on the TPM, such as trusted boot, full disk encryption (Bitlocker), device attestation, and credential protection; the
Chrome OS uses the TPM to prevent firmware rollback attacks and to protect users’ sensitive data and keys. Besides,
TPM also presents a promising usage in the Industry 4.0 [2]: it has been widely used as the hardware root of trust
for the Industry 4.0 devices and can protect the trustworthiness, identity, and communication of the devices. Take
the automotive use case of Industry 4.0 for example, TCG publishes TPM specifications for components of vehicle
systems [3,4]: an Automotive-Rich TPM having rich capabilities can be defined for Head Unit or Gateway components
∗This paper is an extension of the conference version appearing in the Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Trust
and Trustworthy Computing (Trust’15) [1]. This paper presents the details of the proof of the key exchange primitive of the TPM
2.0 specifications, gives concrete suggestions on how to revise the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0 to make it applicable in
real-world networks and achieve a higher level of security, and rigorously analyzes the revised key exchange primitive.
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of vehicle systems with powerful processing, networking and applications functionality, and an Automotive-thin TPM
having fewer capabilities can be defined for Head Unit or Gateway components with limited resources.
The newest TPM specifications, TPM 2.0 [5, 6], allow each platform to choose the functions needed and the level of
security required. This flexibility allows TPM 2.0 to be implemented in different types such as security chips and
protected software in a trusted execution environment (TEE) [7], so that TPM chips can be applied to different kinds
of platforms from low-end embedded devices to PCs and even servers. In conclusion, the TPM plays an important role
in the security of both personal devices and industrial devices.
In this paper, we focus on the secure communication feature of TPM 2.0: the authenticated key exchange (AKE) func-
tionality, which provides secure communication for devices. AKE is an important public key primitive in modern cryp-
tography, which allows two parties to establish a shared secret session key via a public insecure communication while
providing mutual authentication. To prevent active attacks, AKE protocols usually use digital signatures or message
authentication codes (MAC) to explicitly authenticate the messages exchanged [8–11]. However, these authentication
mechanisms incur significant overhead in both computation and communication. To overcome the disadvantages of the
explicitly AKE protocols, the implicitly AKE protocols [12–24] are proposed. This kind of protocols only requires ba-
sic Diffie-Hellman exchanges while providing identity authentication by combining the ephemeral keys and long-term
keys during the derivation of the session key, and achieves efficiency in both computation and communication.
The TPM 2.0 specifications support three implicitly AKE protocols: the Full UnifiedModel (UM) [25], Full MQV [13],
and SM2 key exchange protocols [22]. All the three protocols have been widely standardized: the Full UM and
Full MQV protocols are standardized by ANSI [26, 27], NIST [28], IEEE [29]; the SM2 key exchange protocol is
standardized by the Chinese Government State Cryptography Administration [30] and some industrial standards [31].
TPM 2.0 describes implicitly AKE protocols as two-phase key exchange protocols because TPM 2.0 implements them
in two phases. In the first phase, the TPM generates an ephemeral DH key and sends its public part to the other party.
In the second phase, the TPM generates the unhashed shared secret by combining ephemeral keys and long-term keys,
and then the host of the TPM uses the unhashed shared secret to derive a session key. Some works [32–34] using the
TPM to improve the efficiency or security of AKE protocols have been proposed.
We first introduce some notations used in this paper. Let G′ be a finite Abelian group of order N , G ⊆ G′ be a
subgroup of prime order q. Denote by g a generator of G, by 1G the identity element, by G\1G = G − {1G} the set
of elements of G except 1G, and by h = N/q the cofactor. We use the multiplicative notation for the group operation
in G′. Let u ∈R Zq denote randomly selecting an integer u between 1 and q − 1. Note that G is an elliptic curve
in this work, for all the three protocols are based on elliptic curve cryptography. Let P.x denote the x-coordinate of
point P . The party having A as its public key will be denoted by Aˆ. The Full UM, Full MQV and SM2 key exchange
protocols are described in Figure 1. We let λ denote the security parameter, and H1() : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}λ and
H2() : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}λ are cryptographic hash functions. The Full UM protocol analyzed in this paper includes
the ephemeral public keys exchanged as suggested by [16]. The Full MQV protocol is a variant of the original MQV
protocol [13] which does not include parties’ identifiers in the session key derivation.
1.1 Security models for AKE protocols
In the early days, AKE protocols are designed in an ad-hocmanner and cannot providewell-defined security properties.
To deal with this problem, some rigorous security models are proposed, and by now, it has become a basic requirement
for AKE protocols to achieve the security properties defined by AKE security models. The first security model is
proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [35], which is called BR model. The BR model allows the attacker to control
all communications between the parties, learn secret state of some party by corrupting him, and obtain the session
key of some session by revealing it. However, the BR model does not allow the attacker to get the ephemeral state
of some session and the lack of simulating this attack activity prevents BR model to simulate some practical attack
situations. To deal with this flaw, the CK model [36] and the eCK model [19] simulate the leakage of ephemeral state
of some session by adding the SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal queries to the model respectively. The
SessionStateReveal query allows the attacker to learn the session private information while the EphemeralKeyReveal
query allows the attacker to learn the ephemeral private key – which is stronger is still under discussion. Okamoto [37]
claims that EphemeralKeyReveal is stronger than SessionStateReveal; Cremers [38] argues that SessionStateReveal is
stronger than EphemeralKeyReveal; Boyd et al. [39] show that the two queries are incomparable, while Ustaoglu [40]
shows that the functions of the two queries are essentially the same.
Since the CK model can largely provide no weaker security than the eCK model and the SessionStateReveal query of
the CK model models the high risk of the leakage of the secrets in the unprotected memory of the host better than the
EphemeralKeyReveal query of the eCK model, we build our security model based on the CK model.
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Aˆ : (a,A = ga) Bˆ : (b,B = gb)
X = gx
X
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Y = gy
Y
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Full UM: K = H1(Z1, Z2, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ), where Z1 = g
ab
, Z2 = g
xy
Full MQV: ZA = (Y B
e)h(x+da), ZB = (XA
d)h(y+eb)
K = H2(ZA, Aˆ, Bˆ) = H2(ZB , Aˆ, Bˆ), where
d = avf(X)1
def
= 2l + (X.x mod 2l), e = avf(Y )
def
= 2l + (Y.x mod 2l), l = ⌈q/2⌉
SM2 Key Exchange: ZA = (BY
e)h(a+dx), ZB = (AX
d)h(b+ey)
K = H2(ZA, Aˆ, Bˆ) = H2(ZB , Aˆ, Bˆ), where
d = avf ′(X)
def
= 2l + (X.x mod 2l), e = avf ′(Y )
def
= 2l + (Y.x mod 2l), l = ⌊q/2⌋
Figure 1: The Full UM, Full MQV, and SM2 key exchange Protocols
1.2 Weaknesses of the AKE protocols in TPM 2.0
Unfortunately, all the three AKE protocols adopted by TPM 2.0 are not secure. We summarize their weaknesses in the
following.
We find that the Full UM protocol is completely insecure if an attacker is able to learn the intermediate information
Z1 = g
ab of some session established by Aˆ with Bˆ: the attacker transmits an ephemeral key X ′ = gx
′
generated
by himself to party Bˆ and receives an ephemeral public key Y ′ from Bˆ, then he can compute the session key K =
H(Z1, Y
′x′ , Aˆ, Bˆ,X ′, Y ′), i.e., the attacker is able to impersonate Aˆ to Bˆ indefinitely.
Kaliski presents an unknown-key share (UKS) attack [41] on the original MQV protocol: the attackerM interfaces
with the session establishment between two honest parties Aˆ and Bˆ such that Aˆ is convinced that he is sharing a key
with Bˆ, but Bˆ believes that he is sharing the same session key with M. This UKS attack requires M to register a
specific key C = gc with the certificate authority (CA) and send a specific ephemeral public key X ′ to Bˆ. c and
X ′ are so carefully computed byM that the session keys of sessions (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) and (Bˆ,M, Y,X ′) are identical.
The details of the UKS attack are described in A. Although the Full MQV protocol tries to prevent the above UKS
attack by including identities in the session key derivation, we find that it still cannot achieve the security defined by
modern AKE models ifM is able to learn the unhashed shared Z value: M performs the same steps above, learns
ZB by corrupting the session (Bˆ,M, Y,X
′), thenM can compute the session key of session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ), i.e., the
corruption of the session (Bˆ,M, Y,X ′) helpsM to compromise another session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
Xu et al. introduce two UKS attacks [22] on the SM2 key exchange protocol in which an honest party Aˆ is coerced to
share a session key with the attackerM, but Aˆ thinks that he is sharing the key with another party Bˆ. Both attacks
require M to reveal the unhashed shared ZB of Bˆ. Besides, the first attack requires M to register with the CA a
specific key C = Age where e ∈R Zq, and the second attack requiresM to perform some computations using his
private key after obtaining ZB . The details of the two attacks are described in B.
The above attacks show that the three AKE protocols cannot achieve the security property defined by modern AKE
security models if the attacker is able to get the unhashed values. Unfortunately, this is exactly how the two-phase
key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0 (denoted by tpm.KE) implements these three AKE protocols: Z1 of the Full UM
protocol, the unhashedZ values of the MQV and SM2 key exchange protocols are returned to the host, whose memory
is vulnerable to attacks. So it seems that tpm.KE is not secure.
1.3 Motivations and Contributions
Fortunately, protections provided by the TPM improve the security of tpm.KE. First, all long-term keys are generated
randomly in the TPM, so attackers cannot make the TPM to generate a specific key such as the carefully computed key
C = gc required by Kaliski’s UKS attack or C = Age required by Xu’s first attack. Second, the TPM only provides
well-defined functions through TPM commands [6] in a black-box manner: when a TPM command is invoked, the
TPM chip executes the pre-defined computation procedure and returns the computation result. The second feature
prevents attackers from using a key to perform computations at will. So it seems that the above two features can
prevent Kaliski’s UKS attack and Xu’s attacks. However, in modern cryptography, rigorous proofs of security in
1The avf() and avf ′() functions receive an elliptic curve point and return a fix length of the least significant bits (LSB) of the
x-coordinate.
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modern security models [19, 36] have become a basic requirement for cryptographic protocols to be standardized and
are essential tools to guarantee the soundness of cryptographic protocols. As the TPM has been widely applied on
kinds of computation platforms, it is important to perform formal analysis about its security mechanisms. This leads
to our first motivation:
1. How to build a security model which can precisely model the TPM’s protections on keys and protocol compu-
tation environments and based on which we can perform rigorous security analysis of tpm.KE?
Although protections provided by the TPM help the MQV and SM2 key exchange protocols to resist current UKS
attacks, the avf() and avf ′() functions used in the MQV and SM2 key exchange protocols respectively make that the
two protocols cannot be proven secure. Consider such a groupG that the representations of its elements satisfy that the
⌈q/2⌉ least significant bits (LSBs) of the representations of points’ x-coordinate are fixed. In this case, an attacker can
mount the so-called group representation attacks on the MQV and SM2 key exchange protocols, in which the attacker
can impersonate Aˆ to Bˆ without knowing the private key of Aˆ. The group representation attack on MQV is described
in C, and a similar attack on the SM2 key exchange protocol can be found in [42]. HMQV, a variant of MQV, prevents
this type of attack by replacing avf() with a cryptographic hash function, which enables the protocol to be proven
secure in the CK model. Zhao et al. [42] also suggest replacing the avf ′() function of the SM2 key exchange protocol
with a cryptographic hash function. However, group representation attacks are not practical, for it is difficult to find an
elliptic curve whose ⌈q/2⌉ LSBs of the representations of points’ x-coordinate are fixed. On the contrary, the outputs
of the avf() and avf ′() functions seem to range in a uniform way over all possible values. This leads to our second
motivation:
2. Can we give a quantitative measure of the amount of randomness (entropy) contained in the output distribu-
tions of avf() and avf ′() on real-world elliptic curves and check whether avf() and avf ′() provide enough
entropy to prevent group representation attacks?
As far as we know, current modern AKE security models only consider how to formally analyze one single protocol,
thus all AKE protocols proven secure in the literature are analyzed separately. However, tpm.KE is designed to support
three implicitly AKE protocols through unified interfaces, so we cannot use current security models to analyze tpm.KE.
Besides, the design of tpm.KE brings the following security problem that should be considered in its analysis. Suppose
an honest party Aˆ tries to establish a secure channel with Bˆ through MQV and an attacker controls a long-term key of
Bˆ’s TPM, but the type of the key is SM2. Then the question is whether the session key of Aˆ is secure if the attacker
leverages the SM2 key to complete the session. Apparently, it’s desirable for tpm.KE to guarantee the security of
Aˆ’s session key. We denote this security property by correspondence property. The requirements for analyzing multi-
protocols simultaneously and capturing the correspondence property lead to our third motivation:
3. Can we build a unified security AKE model, based on which we can give a formal analysis of tpm.KE which
supports three AKE protocols?
Unfortunately, even if we prove tpm.KE is secure, tpm.KE only guarantees its security under the following conditions:
first, all the entities in the network must use TPM chips to run the AKE protocols and if one entity uses a less secure
implementation of protocols such as a software implementation, the compromise of the software implementation will
affect the security of other honest entities, such as Kaliski’s and Xu’s UKS attacks mentioned above; second, attackers
are assumed to be unable to obtain the information inside the TPM, such as long-term keys. The conditions are
due to the fact that the above security model creates all protocol instances based on the TPM and prohibits attackers
from obtaining information inside the TPM even they compromise the TPM. However, the above conditions are not
practical for real-world networks: first, it is unrealistic to assume that all devices are protected by the TPM, and there
may exist some devices whose execution environments are not secure and can be easily compromised; second, it is
also unrealistic to assume that no TPM is ever compromised because attackers can launch sophisticated attacks such
as invasive attacks, semi-invasive attacks or side-channel attacks to compromise TPM chips. The above unrealistic
assumptions lead to our fourth motivation:
4. How to revise the current version of tpm.KE so that it can be applied in real-world networks where devices
may not be protected by TPM chips and TPM chips may be compromised?
Contributions. We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows:
1. We leverage the min-entropy, a notion in the information theory, to quantitatively evaluate the amount of
randomness in the output distributions of avf() and avf ′(). We evaluate several series of elliptic curves used
in practice, covering all elliptic curves adopted by the TPM 2.0 algorithm specification [43]. The evaluation
4
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results show that avf() and avf ′() provide almost the same level of randomness as cryptographic hash
functions.
2. We model the protections provided by the TPM by modeling the interfaces of tpm.KE as oracles, and present
a unified AKE security model for tpm.KE, which captures not only the basic security property defined by
modern AKE security models but also the correspondence property.
3. We give a formal analysis of tpm.KE in our new model and prove that tpm.KE is secure under the condition
that the unhashed shared secrets are not available to the attacker. This condition can be achieved by slightly
modifying the Full UM functionality of TPM 2.0 or properly implementing the host’s software.
4. The tpm.KE is proven secure under some limiting conditions, resulting in some restrictions on the usage of
tpm.KE, so we give suggestions on how to use tpm.KE properly to achieve a secure implementation of AKE
protocols.
5. The limiting conditions required by the current version of tpm.KE are impractical for real-world networks,
so we present a revision of tpm.KE to eliminate the limiting conditions and give concrete suggestions on how
to revise the current version of TPM 2.0 specifications.
6. We rigorously analyze our revision of tpm.KE, and the analysis results show that our revision achieves not
only the basic security property defined by modern AKE security models but also some further security
properties: resistance to key-compromise impersonation (KCI) and weak Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
1.4 Organization
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 gives some preliminaries. Section 3 introduces the two-phase key exchange primitive
defined by TPM 2.0 specifications, gives a quantitative measure of several series of elliptic curves used in practice, and
presents an informal analysis of tpm.KE. Section 4 presents our unified security model for tpm.KE. Section 5 gives a
formal description of tpm.KE. Section 6 proves the unforgeability of the MQV and SM2 key exchange functionalities
provided by tpm.KE, and it can simplify our security proof. Section 7 formally analyzes the basic security of tpm.KE
in our new model. Section 8 discusses the KCI-resistance and weak PFS properties of tpm.KE. Section 9 gives
suggestions on the usage of the current version of tpm.KE. Section 10 presents our revision of tpm.KE. Sections 11
and 12 rigorously analyze our revision of tpm.KE. Section 13 discusses the KCI-resistance and weak PFS properties
of our revision. Section 14 concludes this paper.
2 Preliminaries
This section first introduces the notion of min-entropy and two popular methods to calculate the min-entropy, and then
introduces the CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellman) and GDH (Gap Diffie-Hellman) assumptions used in this paper.
2.1 Min-entropy
Min-entropy is a notion in information theory, which provides a very strict information-theoretical lower bound (i.e.,
worst-case) measure of randomness for a random variable. High min-entropy indicates that the distribution of the
random variable is close to the uniform distribution. Low min-entropy indicates that there must be a small set of
outcomes that has an unusually high probability, and the small set can help an attacker to perform group representation
attacks. Take the following two extreme cases for example: if the min-entropy of a random variable is equal to the
length of the outcome, the distribution is a uniform distribution, and if the min-entropy of a random variable is zero,
the outcomes of the random variable are a fixed value. From the two extreme cases, we can see that the higher the
min-entropy is, the harder for the attacker to mount group representation attacks. There are two popular methods to
measure the min-entropy of a random variable:
1. NIST SP 800-90. This method is described in NIST specification 800-90 for binary sources. The definition
of min-entropy for one binary bit is: H = −logpmax2 where pmax = max{p0, p1} and p0, p1 are probabilities
that the binary bit outputs zero and one respectively. The min-entropy of an n-bit binary string is defined by:
Htotal =
n∑
i=1
Hi (1)
2. Context-Tree Weighting compression. Context-Tree Weighting (CTW) [44] is an optimal compression algo-
rithm for stationary sources and is usually used to estimate the min-entropy.
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2.2 CDH and GDH Assumptions
The security of modern cryptographic constructions, including the AKE protocols, relies on some widely-believed
assumptions, which are mathematical problems that are hard to solve. The rigorous proof of security typically shows
how to reduce the security of cryptographic constructions to assumptions. Here we list the assumptions that used in
our proof: the CDH and GDH assumptions. The CDH assumption is used in the proof of the unforgeability of MQV
and SM2 key exchange functionalities (Section 6), and the GDH assumption is used in the proof of tpm.KE (Section
7) and the revision of tpm.KE (Sections 12 and 13).
Definition 1 (CDH Assumption). Let G be a cyclic group of order p with generator g. The CDH assumption in
G states that, given two randomly chosen points X = gx and Y = gy, it is computationally infeasible to compute
Z = gxy.
Definition 2 (GDH Assumption). Let G be a cyclic group generated by an element g whose order is p. We say that
a decision algorithm O is a Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Oracle for G and its generator g if on input a triple
(X,Y, Z), for X,Y ∈ G, oracle O outputs 1 if and only if Z = CDH(X,Y ). We say that G satisfies the GDH
assumption if no feasible algorithm can solve the CDH problem, even if the algorithm is provided with a DDH-oracle
for G.
3 The TPM Key Exchange Primitive
In the context of tpm.KE, each party consists of a host and a TPM chip. The host and the TPM together can implement
the three implicitly AKE protocols supported in the TPM 2.0 specifications. In general, the host runs instances of AKE
protocols by exchanging messages between parties and invoking the interfaces of tpm.KE which are implemented as
TPM commands, and at last derives session keys for instances from the shared secrets returned by the TPM. In this
section, we first show how the AKE protocols can be implemented by the host and tpm.KE, and describe the related
TPM commands of tpm.KE, and then give an informal analysis of tpm.KE. In the informal analysis, we present
solutions to prevent impersonation attacks on the Full UM protocol, and a quantitative measure of the randomness of
the output distributions of avf() and avf ′() on all the elliptic curves adopted by the TPM 2.0 specifications.
3.1 Introduction of tpm.KE
tpm.KE consists of two phases. In the first phase, the TPM generates an ephemeral key which will be transferred to
the other party by the TPM’s host. In the second phase, the TPM generates the unhashed secret value according to the
specification of the selected protocol, and the host derives the session key from the unhashed secret value. Before the
two phases, the Key Generation procedure should be invoked to generate a long-term key.
• Key Generation. The commands TPM2_Create() and TPM2_CreatePrimary() are used to generate long-
term keys. They take as input public parameters including an attribute identifying the key exchange
scheme for the long-term key. The scheme should be one of the following three: TPM_ALG_ECDH,
TPM_ALG_ECMQV, and TPM_ALG_SM2. In this procedure, the TPM performs the following steps: if
the command is TPM2_Create(), it picks a random a ∈R Zq and computes A = g
a, and if the command
is TPM2_CreatePrimary(), it derives a from a primary seed using a key derivation function and computes
A = ga; finally, it returns A and a key handle identifying a.
• First Phase. The command TPM2_EC_Ephemeral() is used to generate an ephemeral key, and it performs
the following steps:
1. Generate x = KDFa(Random,Count), where KDFa() is a key derivation function [45], Random is a
secure random value stored inside the TPM, and Count is a counter.
2. Set ctr = Count, A[ctr] = 1, and Count = Count+ 1, where A[] is an array of bits used to indicate
whether the ephemeral key has been used.
3. Set x = x mod q, and generateX = gx.
4. ReturnX and ctr.
Note that the TPM does not need to store the ephemeral private key x as it can be recovered using KDFa()
and ctr.
6
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• Second Phase. The command related to this phase is TPM2_ZGen_2Phase(), and it is the main command
of tpm.KE. This command takes the following items as input:
scheme A protocol scheme selector.
keyA The key handle identifying the long-term private key a.
ctr The counter used to identify the ephemeral key generated in the first phase.
B The public key of Bˆ, with whom Aˆ wants to establish a session.
Y The ephemeral public key received from Bˆ.
1. The TPM first does the following checks:
(a) Whether scheme equals the scheme designated for key A in the key generation procedure.
(b) Whether B and Y are on the curve associated with A.
(c) Whether A[ctr] = 1.
2. If the above checks succeed, the TPM recovers x = KDFa(Random, ctr) and performs the following
steps:
(a) Compute unhashed values according to the value of scheme:
Case TPM_ALG_ECDH:
set Z1 = B
a, Z2 = Y
x;
Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV:
set Z1 = (Y B
e)h(x+da), Z2 = NULL, where d = avf(X) and e = avf(Y );
Case TPM_ALG_SM2:
set Z1 = (BY
e)h(a+dx), Z2 = NULL, where d = avf
′(X) and e = avf ′(Y ).
(b) Clear A[ctr]: set A[ctr] = 0 to ensure that the ephemeral private key x can only be used once.
(c) Return Z1 and Z2.
3. Finally, the host computes the session key leveraging the unhanshed values Z1 and Z2 returned by the
TPM.
3.2 Informal Analysis
In Sections 1.2 and 1.3, we show two weaknesses of tpm.KE which prevent it from achieving the basic security
property defined by modern AKE security models. One weakness is that tpm.KE returns Z1 of the Full UM protocol
to the host whose memory can be compromised, which makes Z1 be available to the attacker. The other one is the
weakness caused by avf() and avf ′(), which results in group representation attacks against the MQV and SM2 key
exchange protocols.
3.2.1 Analysis of the first weakness
The first weakness prevents the Full UM protocol from being proven secure in the security model, and we give two
solutions to overcome the weakness:
1. Perform the entire session key computation of Full UM in the secure environment of the TPM, i.e.,
modify the TPM2_ZGen_2Phase() command not to return Z1 and Z2 but the session key, i.e., K =
H1(Z1, Z2, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
2. Protect Z1 and Z2 from malicious code running on the host as much as possible such as keeping them only
available in the kernel mode, and delete Z1 and Z2 as soon as the session key is derived.
The first solution requires modifying TPM 2.0 specifications, and the second one requires that the software deriving
the session key should be implemented properly and included in the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
3.2.2 Analysis of the second weakness
As it seems that the second weakness only happens in theory, we perform a quantitative measure of the min-entropy
contained in the output distributions of avf() and avf ′() to check whether this weakness can happen in the real world.
We measure several series of widely deployed elliptic curves: the NIST series [46], the BN series [47], the SECG
series [48], and an SM2 elliptic curve [49]. Our measure totals 17 elliptic curves and covers all elliptic curves adopted
by TPM 2.0 [43]. We generate 16384 points for each elliptic curve, apply avf ′() to the points of the SM2 P256 curve,
and apply avf() to the points of the rest curves. We also apply the cryptographic hash function SHA-2 to the generated
points of all curves. Then we measure the min-entropy of the output distributions of avf() (avf ′()) and SHA-2 using
the methods of NIST SP 800-90 (Formula 1) and CTW compression. The measurement results are summarized in
7
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NIST Series BN Series SECG Series SM2
P192 P224 P256 P384 P521 P192 P224 P256 P384 P521 P638 P192 P224 P256 P384 P521 P256
NIST avf() 95.2 111.0 126.9 190.2 258.7 95.1 111.0 126.9 190.2 253.6 315.0 95.2 111.0 126.6 190.4 258.6 125.8
800-89 SHA-2 95.9 112.0 127.9 191.3 259.8 96.2 112.0 128.0 191.2 254.8 316.1 96.0 11.0 127.9 191.3 259.6 126.9
CTW avf() 97% 98% 98% 99% 100% 97% 98% 98% 99% 99% 100% 97% 98% 98% 99% 100% 100%
Ratio SHA-2 98% 98% 99% 99% 100% 98% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100% 98% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100%
Table 1: Min-entropy results
Table 1. Figure 2 shows the development of the min-entropy value calculated using NIST’s method over the number
of measurements. To our surprise, the min-entropy of the output distributions of avf() and avf ′() is very close to the
min-entropy of the output distribution of SHA-2: the former is only about 1 bit less than the latter. What’s more, the
measurement results indicate that the output distributions of avf() and avf ′() are close to the uniform distribution.
Take the measurement of BN P256 for example, the min-entropy calculated by the NIST’s method is 126.9, very close
to the output length of avf() which is 129 = ⌈256/2⌉+1, and the CTW ratio is 98.1% which is close to 100%. Our
measure indicates that the outputs of avf() (avf ′()) on different elliptic curve points are almost independent, and it
is infeasible to mount group representation attacks on real-world elliptic curves. So we model avf() and avf ′() as
random oracles in our formal analysis.
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Figure 2: Min-entropy evaluation
4 The Unified Security Model
This section illustrates our unified security model for tpm.KE and the attacker model which captures the capabilities
of attackers. The first difference between our unified security model and existing security models, such as BR, CK,
and eCK models, is that our model can simulate multiple types of AKE protocols simultaneously. Our model acquires
this feature by adding a scheme identifier to the session identifier. The motivation and detailed techniques of this
feature will be discussed later. The second difference is that our model models the concrete protections provided by
the TPM chip: the attack queries of our model do not allow the attacker to obtain the cryptographic keys protected
inside the TPM nor the ephemeral secrets inside the TPM. For instance, when the attacker corrupts a party, unlike
8
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existing security models, which allow him to get plaintext of the long-term key, our model only allows him to obtain
the black-box access of the TPM commands in respect of the long-term key.
In our security model, each party has a long-term key generated by the TPM and a certificate (issued by a CA) that
binds the public part of the long-term key to the identity of the party. The long-term key can be one of the following
three types: TPM_ALG_ECDH, TPM_ALG_ECMQV, and TPM_ALG_SM2. A party can be activated to invoke the
interfaces of tpm.KE to run an instance of the protocol supported by the long-term key, and an instance of a protocol is
called a session. In each session, a party can be activated as the role of initiator or responder who sends an ephemeral
public key to its peer party, the ephemeral key is generated by invoking the interface of the first phase of tpm.KE, and
a party can complete the session by invoking the interface of the second phase of tpm.KE and computing the session
key.
In modern AKE security models, the session identifier is a quadruple (Aˆ, Bˆ, Out, In), where Aˆ is the identity of the
owner of the session, Bˆ the peer party,Out the outgoingmessages in the session, and In the incoming messages. This
kind of security models work well in proving a single protocol, but it is flawed when used to prove tpm.KE because
tpm.KE supports more than one scheme (type of protocol) and instances running different schemes might have the
same quadruple (Aˆ, Bˆ, Out, In) but should be recognized as different sessions. To deal with this problem, we use
a quintuple (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ, Out, In) as the session identifier where sc denotes the scheme of the session. This kind of
session identifier not only distinguishes between different instances of the same scheme but also distinguishes between
different schemes. For instance, two instances with different original quadruple (Aˆ, Bˆ, Out, In), such as the two
sessions (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ, Out, In) and (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ, Out′, In) having different outgoing messages, are recognized as different
sessions. And furthermore, two instances with same original quadruple (Aˆ, Bˆ, Out, In) but running different schemes,
such as the two sessions (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ, Out, In) and (sc′, Aˆ, Bˆ, Out, In), are also recognized as different sessions. In
particular, in the case of implicitly AKE protocols where the communication is basic Diffie-Hellman exchanges the
session identifier is (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) where X is the outgoing DH value and Y the incoming DH value to the session.
The session (sc, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X) (if it exists) is said to be matching to the session (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ), and the session
(sc′, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X) where sc′ 6= sc (if it exists) is said to bemessage-matching to the session (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
The sc in the session identifier brings an issue we must address: how about the security of the session (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y )
if it has a corrupted message-matching session? Previous AKE security models do not capture this attack because they
do not support formal analysis of multiple kinds of protocols in a unified way. However, this attack can happen on
tpm.KE because it supports three AKE schemes and the TPM 2.0 specifications do not force the TPM to check the
key type of its peer party. We say tpm.KE satisfies correspondence property if it can resist the above attack, i.e., the
session (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) is secure if its message-matching session is compromised.
Attacker Model. The model involves multiple honest parties and an attacker M connected via an unauthenticated
network. The attacker is modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine and has full control of the communications
between parties.M can intercept and modifymessages sent over the network.M also schedules all session activations
and session-message delivery. In addition, in order to model potential disclosure of secret information, the attacker is
allowed to access secret information via the following queries:
• SessionStateReveal(s):M directly queries at session s while still incomplete and learns the session state for
s. In our analysis, the session state includes the values returned by interfaces of tpm.KE and intermediate
information stored and computed in the host.
• SessionKeyReveal(s):M obtains the session key for the session s.
• Corruption(Pˆ ): In other AKE security models, this query allowsM to learn the plaintext of the long-term
private key of party Pˆ . In our model,M does not learn anything about the plaintext of the long-term private
key but obtains the black-box access of the key via TPM interfaces.
• Test(s): Pick b
R
←− 0, 1. If b = 1, provideM with the session key; otherwise provideM with a random value
r ∈R {0, 1}
λ. This query can only be issued to a session that is “clean". A completed session is “clean" if
the session as well as its matching session (if it exists) is not subject to the above three queries. A session is
called “exposed" ifM performs any one of the above three queries to this session.
Note that our model differs from previous AKE security models in that the Corruption query to some party does not
provide the attacker with the plaintext of the long-term private key of the party but the black-box access of the long-
term key which is randomly generated and protected by the TPM. This difference captures the protections provided by
the TPM, which are described in Section 1.3.
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The security is defined based on an experiment played byM, in whichM is allowed to activate sessions and perform
SessionStateReveal, SessionKeyReveal, and Corruption queries. At some time,M performs the Test query to a clean
session of its choice and gets the value returned by Test. After that, M continues the experiment but is not allowed
to expose the test session and its matching session (if it exists). Eventually,M outputs a bit b′ as its guess, then halts.
M wins the game if b′ = b. The attacker with the above capabilities is called a KE-attacker. The formal security is
defined as follows.
Definition 3. The advantage of any KE-attackerM in the above experiment with tpm.KE is defined as
Advtpm.KE(M) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
tpm.KE is called secure if the following properties hold for any KE-attackerM.
1. When two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions, they output the same session key, and
2. If no efficient attackerM has more than a negligible advantage in winning the above experiment.
The first condition is a “consistency" requirement for sessions completed by two uncorrupted parties. The second
condition is the core property for the security of tpm.KE: it guarantees that exposure of one session does not help the
attacker to compromise the security of another session. Note that our security definition of tpm.KE allows the attacker
to expose the message-matching session, that is to say, the test session is still secure even if the message-matching
session is exposed by the attacker. Thus, our model captures the correspondence property.
The Definition 3 defines the basic security property that a modern AKE protocol should achieve, and it captures the
common UKS attacks. We illustrate how the UKS attacks are captured in our security model. In a UKS attack, a party
Aˆ ends up believing he shares a key with party Bˆ, and Bˆ ends up mistakenly believing the key is shared with the
attackerM. Suppose the identifier of Aˆ’s session is (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) and that of Bˆ’s session is (sc, Bˆ,M, X ′, Y ′).
The two sessions apparently are not either identical or matching, so according to Definition 3, the attacker M can
expose the session (sc, Bˆ,M, X ′, Y ′) to attack Aˆ’s session (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ). The above illustration shows that if a
protocol is proven secure under the unified security model, it should resist UKS attacks.
5 Formal Description of tpm.KE
The implementation of tpm.KE in the TPM 2.0 includes two phases. The first phase is to generate an ephemeral
key which is transferred to the party which the owner wants to establish a session with, and the first phase is the
same to all the three protocols supported by the TPM 2.0 specifications. The second phase provides the key exchange
functionalities which generate the unhashed secret values or session keys according to the specification of the protocol.
Since parties or the attacker can only use tpm.KE in a black-box manner: they can only use tpm.KE’ functionalities
by invoking its interfaces and do not know the secrets inside the TPM. To model the black-box manner of tpm.KE, we
simulate tpm.KE by formalizing its interfaces as a series of oracles which receive inputs and return outputs.
We model the interface of the first phase of tpm.KE by the oracle ephemA() where A is the long-term key of Aˆ. We
model the second phase of tpm.KE as three oracles: the Full UM, MQV, and SM2 key exchange functionalities of
tpm.KE are modeled as oracle OECA , oracle O
MQV
A , and oracle O
SM2
A respectively. O
MQV
A and O
SM2
A take as input the
input of TPM2_ZGen_2Phase() and return the unhashed values. We let OECA directly return the session key but not
the unhashed values Z1 and Z2, and this modification simulates our solutions to the first weakness of tpm.KE. We
now formally describe tpm.KE through the following three session activations.
1. Initiate(sc, Aˆ, Bˆ): Aˆ invokes ephemA() of its TPM to obtain an ephemeral public key X and an index ctrx
identifying the ephemeral private key x stored in the TPM, creates a local session which is identified as (an
incomplete) session (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X), where sc is the key exchange scheme supported by the long-term key A,
and outputsX as its outgoing ephemeral public key.
2. Respond(sc, Bˆ, Aˆ,X) (sc is the scheme supported byB): After receivingX , Bˆ performs the following steps:
(a) Invoke ephemB() of its TPM to obtain an ephemeral public key Y and an index ctry identifying the
ephemeral private key y stored in the TPM; output Y as its outgoing ephemeral public key.
(b) With input (sc, keyB, ctry, A,X) where keyB is the key handle of B, invoke the corresponding oracle
according to the value of sc:
Case TPM_ALG_ECDH: InvokeOECB and set the session keyK to be the return result of O
EC
B .
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Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV: Invoke OMQVB , obtain ZB from the return result, and compute the session
keyK = H2(ZB , Aˆ, Bˆ).
Case TPM_ALG_SM2: Invoke OSM2B , obtain ZB from the return result, and compute the session key
K = H2(ZB, Aˆ, Bˆ).
(c) Complete the session with identifier (sc, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X).
3. Complete(sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ): Aˆ checks that it has an open session with identifier (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X), and then per-
forms the following steps:
(a) With input (sc, keyA, ctrx, B, Y ) where keyA is the key handle of A, invoke the corresponding oracle
according to the value of sc:
Case TPM_ALG_ECDH: InvokeOECA and set the session keyK to be the return result of O
EC
A .
Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV: Invoke OMQVA , obtain ZA from the return result, and compute the session
keyK = H2(ZA, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Case TPM_ALG_SM2: Invoke OSM2A , obtain ZA from the return result, and compute the session key
K = H2(ZA, Aˆ, Bˆ).
(b) Complete the session with identifier (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
6 Unforgeability of MQV and SM2 Key Exchange Functionalities
In this section, we give the formal definitions of MQV and SM2 key exchange functionalities of tpm.KE, denoted by
OMQVB andO
SM2
B respectively whereB is the public key of the party. In Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we formally prove
the unforgeability of OMQVB and O
SM2
B with a constraint on the attacker respectively. Although the unforgeability of
OMQVB and O
SM2
B does not directly prove the security analysis of tpm.KE, it acts as a building block in the security of
tpm.KE and greatly simplifies our security analysis. In some cases in our security proof in Section 7, we reduce the
security of tpm.KE to the unforgeability ofOMQVB orO
SM2
B : if the attacker is able to break the security of tpm.KE, we
can leverage it to forge the result of OMQVB or O
SM2
B .
Definition 4 (The MQV Functionality of tpm.KE). The functionality (OMQVB ) is provided by a party possessing a
private/public key pair (b, B = gb). A challenger, possessing a private/public key pair (a,A = ga), provides OMQVB
with a challengeX = gx (x is chosen and kept secret by the challenger). With the pair (A,X), OMQVB first computes
an ephemeral private/public key pair (y, Y = gy) and returns Z = (XAd)h(y+eb) where d = avf(X) and e =
avf(Y ). The challenger can verify the return result (Y, Z) with respect to the challenge X by checking whether
Z = (Y Be)h(x+da).
Definition 5 (The SM2 Key Exchange Functionality of tpm.KE). The functionality (OSM2B ) is provided by a party
possessing a private/public key pair (b, B = gb). A challenger, possessing a private/public key pair (a,A = ga),
provides OSM2B with a challengeX = g
x (x is chosen and kept secret by the challenger). With the pair (A,X), OSM2B
first computes an ephemeral private/public key pair (y, Y = gy) and returns Z = (AXd)h(b+ey), where d = avf ′(X)
and e = avf ′(Y ). The challenger can verify the return result (Y, Z) with respect to the challenge X by checking
whether Z = (BY e)h(a+dx).
Theorem 1. Under the CDH assumption, with avf() modeled as a random oracle, given a challengeX , it is compu-
tationally infeasible for an attacker to forge a return result of OMQVB on behalf of a challenger whose public key is A
under the constraint that (a, x) is unknown to the attacker.
The constraint is reasonable because the TPM prevents attackers from obtaining the plaintext of keys in it. We prove
Theorem 1 by showing that if an attackerM can forge a return result under our constraint, then we can construct a
CDH solver C which usesM as a subroutine.
Proof. C takes as input a pair (X,B) ∈ G2 and (a,A = ga), and it simulates OMQVB as follows:
1. On receipt of the input (A′, X ′), choose e, s ∈ Zq randomly.
2. Let Y ′ = gs/Be, and set avf(Y ′) = e.
3. Choose d randomly, and set avf(X ′) = d.
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4. Return (Y, Z ′ = (X ′Ad)hs).
IfM successfully forges a return result (Y, Z) on the pair (A,X) in an experiment, then C obtainsZ = (XAd)h(y+eb)
where d = avf(X) and e = avf(Y ). Note that without the knowledge of the private key y of Y , C is unable to
compute CDH(X,B). Following the Forking Lemma [50] approach, C runsM on the same input and the same coin
flips but with carefully modified answers to avf() queries. Note that M must have queried avf(Y ) in its first run
because otherwiseM would be unable to compute Z . For the second run ofM, C responds to avf(Y ) with a value
e′ 6= e selected uniformly at random. If M succeeds in the second run, C obtains Z ′ = (XAd)h(y+e
′b) and can
compute CDH(X,B) = ( ZZ′ )
1
h(e−e′)B−da. 
Theorem 2. Under the CDH assumption, with avf ′() modeled as a random oracle, given a challengeX , it is compu-
tationally infeasible for an attacker to forge a return result of OSM2B on behalf of a challenger whose public key is A
under the constraint that (a, x) is unknown to the attacker.
We omit the proof of theorem 2 because it can be easily completed following the proof of theorem 1.
7 Security Analysis of tpm.KE
Although our model is based on the CK model, the security analysis based on our new model differs from that based
on the CK model in some aspects. First the Corrupt query in our model does not let the attacker obtain the plaintext of
the long-term key but only allows him to get the black-box access of the long-term key. The second difference is about
the session state that allows the attacker to get by the SessionStateReveal query. For most security analysis of AKE
protocols, the session state is defined by the requirement of the proof. For instance, the security analysis of the HMQV
protocol [17] requires that the session state only includes the session key, which means that the SessionStateReveal
query and the SessionKeyReveal query are the same. But for the security analysis of tpm.KE, we need to define
the session state according to the specifications of tpm.KE: we have to put into session state all the secrets that are
processed and stored on the host’s memory which is easily to be tampered with. In the following we define the session
state allowed to be revealed by the attacker.
Session State. In order to simulate the protections provided by the TPM, we specify that the state of a session stores
the results returned by the TPM and the information stored in the host. For the Full UM scheme, the session state is
the session key; for the MQV and SM2 key exchange schemes, the session state is the unhashed values returned by
the TPM.
Theorem 3. Under the CDH and GDH assumptions, with hash functionsH1(), H2(), avf(), and avf
′() modeled as
random oracles, tpm.KE is secure in the unified model.
Let AdvGDH(C), AdvO
MQV
(C) and AdvO
SM2
(C) denote the advantage of an algorithm C in solving the GDH problem,
forging the functionality of OMQV, and forging the functionality of OSM2. For any attackerM against tpm.KE whose
security parameter is λ, and that involves at most n parties and activates at most k sessions, we construct a GDH
solver S, a OMQV forger FMQV, and a OSM2 forger FSM2 such that
Advtpm.KE(M) ≤
1
2
·max
{
3n2k · AdvGDH(S),
9
2
(nk)2 · AdvGDH(S),
9
2
(nk)2 · AdvO
MQV
(FMQV), 3n2k · AdvO
SM2
(FSM2)
}
+
1
2
· O(
k2
2λ
).
Proof. The proof of the above theorem follows from the definition of secure key exchange protocols outlined in
Section 4 and the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4. If two parties Aˆ and Bˆ complete matching sessions, then their session keys are the same.
Lemma 5. Under the CDH and GDH assumptions, there is no feasible attacker that succeeds in distinguishing the
session key of an unexposed session with non-negligible probability.
Lemma 4 follows immediately from the definition of matching sessions. That is, if Aˆ completes the session
(sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) and Bˆ completes the matching session (sc, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X), it’s easy to verify that Aˆ’s session key is
the same as Bˆ’s according to the specifications of the protocols (Figure 1).
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We now prove Lemma 5. LetM be an attacker against tpm.KE and ts the test session. Let COLL denote the event that
the random oracles produce collisions, GET the event that the attacker gets the session key of ts, QUERY the event
that someone, either the attacker or some party, queries the random oracle with the same tuple σ as that of ts, E1 the
event that the attacker himself queries the random oracle with the same tuple σ as that of ts, E2 the event that some
party queries the random oracle with the same tuple σ as that of ts. Observe that Pr
[
b′ = b | GET ∧ COLL
]
= 12 ,
Pr
[
b′ = b | GET ∧ COLL
]
= 1, Pr
[
GET ∧ QUERY ∧ COLL
]
= 0, and Pr [QUERY] = Pr [E1]+Pr [E2], we may
write
Advtpm.KE(M) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣Pr [b′ = b ∧ COLL] + Pr [b′ = b ∧ GET ∧ COLL] +Pr [b′ = b ∧ GET ∧ COLL]− 1
2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣Pr [b′ = b ∣∣ COLL] · Pr [COLL] + Pr [b′ = b ∣∣ GET ∧ COLL] · Pr [GET ∧ COLL]
+
1
2
· Pr
[
GET ∧ COLL
]
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣Pr [b′ = b ∣∣ COLL] · Pr [COLL] + Pr [b′ = b ∣∣ GET ∧ COLL] · Pr [GET ∧ COLL]
+
1
2
·
(
1− Pr [COLL]− Pr
[
GET ∧ COLL
])
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣
≤
1
2
·
(
Pr
[
GET ∧ COLL
]
+ Pr [COLL]
)
≤
1
2
·
(
Pr
[
GET ∧ QUERY ∧ COLL
]
+ Pr
[
GET ∧ QUERY ∧ COLL
]
+ Pr [COLL]
)
≤
1
2
·
(
Pr
[
GET ∧ E1 ∧ COLL
]
+ Pr
[
GET ∧ E2 ∧ COLL
]
+ Pr [COLL]
)
If random oracles produce no collisions, the event GET∧E1∧COLLmeans thatM himself queries the random oracle
with the same tuple σ as that of ts and gets the session key of ts. We denote this event by the forging attack. And if
random oracles produce no collisions, the event GET ∧ E2 ∧ COLL means thatM gets the session key of ts but he
does not query the random oracle with the tuple σ of ts, and that some party establishes a session s ′ with the same
tuple σ of ts. SinceM himself does not query the tuple σ of ts and is not allowed to reveal ts in the experiment, he
must get the session key of ts by revealing s ′. So the event GET∧E2∧COLL implies thatM forces the establishment
of another session s ′ that has the same session key as the test session and he gets the session key of the test session by
revealing s ′, and we denote this event by the key-replication attack. We summarize the two attacks as follows:
1. Forging attack. At some pointM queriesH1() orH2() on the same tuple σ as the test session.
2. Key-replication attack. M succeeds in forcing the establishment of another session that has the same session
key as the test session.
The rest of this section will prove the infeasibility of forging attack and key-replication attack by showing that if either
of the above attacks succeed with non-negligible probability then there exists an attacker against the GDH problem or
a forger against the MQV functionality of tpm.KE, or a forger against the SM2 key exchange functionality of tpm.KE,
and the latter two forgers are in contradiction to the CDH assumption (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2). The proof of
Lemma 5 will be completed after the proof of the infeasibility of forging attack and key-replication attack. 
7.1 Infeasibility of Forging Attacks
Consider a successful forging attack performed byM. Let (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0) be the test session for whose tupleM
outputs a correct guess. By the convention on session identifiers, we know that the test session is held by Aˆ, its peer is
Bˆ, X0 was output by Aˆ, and Y0 was the incoming message to Aˆ. sc can fall under one of the following three cases:
1. sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH.
2. sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV.
3. sc = TPM_ALG_SM2.
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As we assume thatM succeeds with non-negligible probability in the forging attack, there is at least one of the above
three cases that occurs with non-negligible probability. We assume thatM operates in an environment that involves at
most n parties and each party participates in at most k sessions. We analyze the three cases separately in the following.
7.1.1 Analysis of Case 1
For this case, we build a GDH solver S1 with the following property: ifM succeeds with non-negligible probability
in this case, then S1 succeeds with non-negligible probability in solving the GDH problem. S1 takes as input a pair
(A,B), creates an experiment which includes n honest parties and the attacker M, and is given access to a DDH
oracleDDH . S1 randomly selects two parties Aˆ and Bˆ from the honest parties and sets their public keys to be A and
B respectively, and all the other parties compute their keys normally. Furthermore, S1 randomly selects an integer
i ∈ [1, ..., k]. The simulation forM’s environment proceeds as follows:
0. S1 models ephemP () for all parties except party Bˆ following the description in Section 5. M sets the type
of all long-term keys. If the type of A is not TPM_ALG_ECDH, S1 aborts. S1 creates oracles modeling the
two-phase key exchange functionalities for each party normally except parties Aˆ and Bˆ because it possesses
the long-term private keys of all parties except Aˆ and Bˆ. H1(), H2(), avf(), and avf
′() are modeled as
random oracles described below.
1. Initiate(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2): Pˆ1 executes the Initiate() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created
is the i-th session at Aˆ, S1 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If not, S1 aborts.
2. Respond(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Y ): With the exception of Aˆ and Bˆ (whose behaviors we explain below), Pˆ1 executes
the Respond() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created is the i-th session at Aˆ, S1
checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If not, S1 aborts.
3. Complete(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ): With the exception of Aˆ and Bˆ (whose behaviors we explain below), Pˆ1 exe-
cutes the Complete() activation of the protocol. However, if the session is the i-th session at Aˆ, S1 completes
the session without computing a session key.
4. With the input (sc, keyA, ctrx, P, Y ), S1 creates the oracle O
EC
A as follows:
(a) If Pˆ = Bˆ, OECA returns a session key to beHspec(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ). Hspec() is simulated as a random oracle.
(b) If Pˆ 6= Bˆ, returns a session key to be H1(Z1, Z2, Aˆ, Pˆ , X, Y ) where Z1 = A
p (p is the long-term
private key of Pˆ ) and Z2 = Y
x (x is the ephemeral private key indexed by ctrx).
5. Now S1 can simulate all the session activations at Aˆ forM with the help of O
EC
A .
6. S1 creates a Table T and models ephemB() according to the type of B:
(a) Case TPM_ALG_ECDH: Model following the description in Section 5.
(b) Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV:
i. Randomly choose e, s ∈ Zq .
ii. Set Y = gs/Be and e = avf(Y ).
iii. Randomly choose an index ctr, and add a record (ctr, e, s, Y,−) to T .
iv. Return ctr and Y .
(c) Case TPM_ALG_SM2:
i. Randomly choose e, s ∈ Zq .
ii. Set Y = (gs/B)e
−1
and e = avf ′(Y ).
iii. Randomly choose an index ctr, and add a record (ctr, e, s, Y,−) to T .
iv. Return ctr and Y .
7. With the input (sc, keyB, ctry, P,X), S1 creates the oracle O
EC
B to model the two-phase key exchange func-
tionality for party Bˆ according to the type of B:
(a) Case TPM_ALG_ECDH: OECB is modeled similarly to O
EC
A which is described in step 4.
(b) Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV:
i. Check whether (1) sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV, (2) P andX are on the curve associated with B, and
(3) the last element of the record in T indexed by ctry is ‘−’. If the above checks succeed, continue,
else return an error.
ii. Suppose the record in T indexed by ctry is (ctry , e, s, Y,−), setZ1 = (XP
d)hs where d = avf(X),
and set the last element of the record to be ×.
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iii. Return (Z1, Z2 = NULL).
(c) Case TPM_ALG_SM2:
i. Check whether (1) sc = TPM_ALG_SM2, (2) P andX are on the curve associated with B, and (3)
the last element of the record in T indexed by ctry is ‘−’. If the above checks pass, continue, else
return an error.
ii. Suppose the record in T indexed by ctry is (ctry , e, s, Y,−), set Z1 = (PX
d)hs where d =
avf ′(X), and set the last element of the record to be ×.
iii. Return (Z1, Z2 = NULL).
8. S1 simulates all the session activations at Bˆ forM with the help of ephemB() and the oracle created in step
7.
9. SessionStateReveal(s): S1 returns toM the session state of session s. However, if s is the i-th session at Aˆ,
S1 aborts.
10. SessionKeyReveal(s): S1 returns toM the session key of s. If s is the i-th session at Aˆ, S1 aborts.
11. Corruption(Pˆ ): S1 givesM the handle of the long-term key P . IfM tries to corrupt Aˆ or Bˆ, S1 aborts.
12. H1(σ) function for some σ = (Z1, Z2, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) proceeds as follows:
(a) If Pˆ1 = Aˆ, Pˆ2 = Bˆ, and DDH(A,B,Z1) = 1, then S1 aborts M and succeeds by outputting
CDH(A,B) = Z1.
(b) If the value of the function on input σ has been defined previously, return it.
(c) If the value ofHspec() on input (Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) has been defined previously, return it.
(d) Pick a random key k ∈R {0, 1}
λ, and defineH1(σ) = k.
13. Hspec(), H2(), avf(), and avf
′() are simulated as random oracles in the usual way.
Proof. The probability thatM sets the type ofA to beTPM_ALG_ECDH and selects the i-th session of Aˆ and the peer
of the test session is party Bˆ is at least 13n2k . Suppose that this indeed the case: the type ofA is TPM_ALG_ECDH, so
S1 does not abort in Step 0;M is not allowed to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ, make SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal
queries to the i-th session of Aˆ, so S1 does not abort in Step 1, 2, 9, 10, 11. Therefore, S1 simulatesM’s environment
perfectly. Thus, ifM wins with non-negligible probability in this case, the success probability of S1 is bounded by
Pr(S1) ≥
1
3n2kPr(M).

7.1.2 Analysis of Case 2
Recall that the test session is denoted by (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0). We divide Case 2 of the forging attack into the following
four subcases according to the generation of Y0:
C1. Y0 was generated by Bˆ in a session matching the test session, i.e., in session (sc, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y0, X0).
C2. Y0 was generated by Bˆ in a session message-matching the test session, i.e., in session (sc
′, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y0, X0) with
sc′ 6= sc.
C3. Y0 was generated by Bˆ in a session (sc
′, Bˆ, Aˆ∗, Y0, X
∗) with (Aˆ∗, X∗) 6= (Aˆ,X0).
C4. Y0 did not appear in any completed sessions activated at Bˆ, i.e., Y0 was never output by Bˆ as its outgoing
ephemeral public key in any sessions, or Bˆ did output Y0 as its outgoing ephemeral public key for some session
s but it never completed s by computing the session key.
IfM succeeds in Case 2 in its forging attack with non-negligible probability then there is at least one of the above four
subcases happens with non-negligible probability in the successful runs ofM. We proceed to analyze these subcases
separately.
Analysis of Subcase C1. For this subcase, we build a GDH solver S2 with the following property: if M succeeds
with non-negligible probability in this subcase, then S2 succeeds with non-negligible probability in solving the GDH
problem. S2 takes as input a pair (X0, Y0), creates an experiment which includes n honest parties and the attackerM,
and is given access to a DDH oracle DDH . All parties compute their keys normally. S2 randomly selects two party
Aˆ and Bˆ and randomly selects two integers i, j ∈ [1, ..., k]. The simulation forM’s environment proceeds as follows:
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0. S2 models ephemP () for all parties following the description in Section 5. M sets the type of all long-term
keys. If the type of A and B is not TPM_ALG_ECMQV, S2 aborts. S2 can create oracles modeling the
two-phase key exchange functionalities for each party normally as it possesses the long-term private keys of
all parties.
1. Initiate(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2): Pˆ1 executes the Initiate() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created
is the i-th session at Aˆ (or the j-th session at Bˆ), S2 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV and Pˆ2 = Bˆ
(or Pˆ2 = Aˆ). If so, S2 sets the ephemeral public key to beX0 (or Y0), else S2 aborts.
2. Respond(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Y ): Pˆ1 executes the Respond() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being
created is the i-th session at Aˆ (or the j-th session at Bˆ), S2 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV,
Pˆ2 = Bˆ (or Pˆ2 = Aˆ), and Y = Y0 (or Y = X0). If so, S2 sets the ephemeral public key to be X0 (or Y0),
else S2 aborts.
3. Complete(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ): Pˆ1 executes the Complete() activation of the protocol. However, if the session
is the i-th session at Aˆ (or the j-th session at Bˆ), S2 completes the session without computing a session key.
4. SessionStateReveal(s): S2 returns toM the session state of session s. However, if s is the i-th session at Aˆ
(or the j-th session at Bˆ), S2 aborts.
5. SessionKeyReveal(s): S2 returns toM the session key of s. If s is the i-th session at Aˆ (or the j-th session
at Bˆ), S2 aborts.
6. Corruption(Pˆ ): S2 givesM the handle of the long-term key P . IfM tries to corrupt Aˆ or Bˆ, S2 aborts.
7. H2(σ) function for some σ = (Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) proceeds as follows:
(a) If Pˆ1 = Aˆ, Pˆ2 = Bˆ, and DDH(X0A
d, Y0B
e, Z1/h) = 1 where d = avf(X0) and e = avf(Y0), then
S2 abortsM and succeeds by outputting CDH(X0, Y0) =
Z1/h
Xeb0 Y
da
0 g
deab .
(b) If the value of the function on input σ has been defined previously, return it.
(c) Pick a random key k ∈R {0, 1}
λ, and defineH2(σ) = k.
8. H1(), avf(), and avf
′() are simulated as random oracles in the usual way.
Proof. The probability thatM sets the type of A and B to be TPM_ALG_ECMQV and selects the i-th session of Aˆ
and the j-th session of Bˆ as the test session and its matching session is at least 13 ×
1
3 ×
2
(nk)2 =
2
9(nk)2 . Suppose
that this is indeed the case: the type of A and B is TPM_ALG_ECMQV, so S2 does not abort in Step 0; M is not
allowed to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ, make SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal queries to the i-th session of Aˆ or the
j-th session of Bˆ, so S2 does not abort in Step 1, 2, 4, 5, 6. Therefore, S2 simulatesM’s environment perfectly. Thus,
ifM wins with non-negligible probability in this case, the success probability of S2 is bounded by
Pr(S2) ≥
2
9(nk)2Pr(M).

Analysis of Subcase C2. For this subcase, we show thatM can break the unforgeability of the MQV functionality
proved in theorem 1 if it succeeds with non-negligible probability. We build a simulator S3 which simulates M’s
environment. S3 takes as input a challenge X0, and creates an experiment which includes n honest parties and the
attackerM. All parties compute their keys normally. S3 randomly selects two parties Aˆ and Bˆ, and randomly selects
two integers i, j ∈ [1, ..., k]. The simulation forM’s environment proceeds as follows:
0. S3 models ephemP () for all parties following the description in Section 5. M sets the types for all long-term
keys. If the type of A is not TPM_ALG_ECMQV and the type of B is TPM_ALG_ECMQV, S3 aborts.
S3 can create oracles modeling the two-phase key exchange functionalities for each party normally as it
possesses the long-term private keys of all parties.
1. Initiate(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2): Pˆ1 executes the Initiate() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created
is the i-th session at Aˆ, S3 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If so, S3 sets the
ephemeral public key to be X0, else S3 aborts. If the session being created is the j-th session at Bˆ, S3
checks whether sc 6= TPM_ALG_ECMQV and Pˆ2 is Aˆ. If so, S3 calls ephemB() to create an ephemeral key,
denoted by Y0, and sets the outgoing ephemeral key of this session to be Y0, else S3 aborts.
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2. Respond(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Y ): Pˆ1 executes the Respond() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being
created is the i-th session at Aˆ, S3 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV, Pˆ2 = Bˆ, and Y = Y0. If so,
S3 providesM with the value X0, else S3 aborts. If the session being created is the j-th session at Bˆ, S3
checks whether sc 6= TPM_ALG_ECMQV, Pˆ2 = Aˆ, and Y = X0. If so, S3 calls ephemB() to create an
ephemeral key, denoted by Y0, and sets the outgoing ephemeral key of this session to be Y0, else S3 aborts.
3. Complete(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ): Pˆ1 executes the Complete() activation of the protocol. However, if the session
is the i-th session at Aˆ, S3 completes the session without computing a session key.
4. SessionStateReveal(s): S3 returns toM the session state of session s. However, if s is the i-th session at Aˆ,
S3 aborts.
5. SessionKeyReveal(s): S3 returns toM the session key of s. If s is the i-th session at Aˆ, S3 aborts.
6. Corruption(Pˆ ): S3 givesM the handle of the long-term key P . IfM tries to corrupt Aˆ or Bˆ, S3 aborts.
7. H1(), H2(), avf(), and avf
′() are simulated as random oracles in the usual way.
Proof. The probability that M sets the type of A to be TPM_ALG_ECMQV and the type of B not to be
TPM_ALG_ECMQV and selects the i-th session of Aˆ and the j-th session of Bˆ as the test session and its message-
matching session is at least 13 ×
2
3 ×
1
(nk)2 =
2
9(nk)2 . Suppose that this is indeed the case: the type of A is
TPM_ALG_ECMQV and the type of B is not TPM_ALG_ECMQV, so S3 does not abort in Step 0; M is not al-
lowed to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ, make SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal queries to the i-th session of Aˆ, so S3
does not abort in Step 1, 2, 4, 5, 6. Therefore, S2 simulatesM’s environment perfectly except with negligible prob-
ability. By the assumption, M correctly guesses the tuple (Z = (Y0B
e)h(x0+da), Aˆ, Bˆ) of the test session where
d = avf(X0) and e = avf(Y0). We now show that (Y0, Z) is a valid forgery against O
MQV
B on input (X0, A) where
X0 is the challenge:
1. (Y0, Z) is a valid return result of O
MQV
B as Z = (Y0B
e)h(x0+da) = (X0A
d)h(y0+eb).
2. OMQVB never returns the result (Y0, Z) on input (X0, A) under S3: O
MQV
B has never been created by S3 as the
type of B is not TPM_ALG_ECMQV in this subcase.
3. SinceM is not allowed to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ,M does not know a and b. SoM does not know the private key
pair (a, x0). Thus,M is under the constraint described in theorem 1.
Finally we get: Pr(M succeeds in forgingOMQVB under S3) ≥
2
9(nk)2Pr(M). 
Analysis of Subcases C3 and C4. For the two subcases, we show thatM can break the unforgeability of the MQV
functionality proved in theorem 1 if it succeeds with non-negligible probability. We build a simulator S4 which
simulates M’s environment. S4 takes as input a challenge X0, and creates an experiment which includes n honest
parties and the attackerM. All parties compute their keys normally. S4 randomly selects two parties Aˆ and Bˆ, and
randomly selects one integer i ∈ [1, ..., k]. The simulation forM’s environment proceeds as follows:
0. S4 models ephemP () for all parties following the description in Section 5. M sets the type for all long-term
keys. If the type of A is not TPM_ALG_ECMQV, S4 aborts. S4 can create oracles modeling the two-phase
key exchange functionalities for each party normally as it possesses the long-term private keys of all the
parties.
1. Initiate(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2): Pˆ1 executes the Initiate() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created
is the i-th session at Aˆ, S4 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If so, S4 sets the
ephemeral public key to beX0, else S4 aborts.
2. Respond(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Y ): Pˆ1 executes the Respond() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being
created is the i-th session at Aˆ, S4 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If so, S4 provides
M with the valueX0, else S4 aborts.
3. Complete(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ): Pˆ1 executes the Complete() activation of the protocol. However, if the session
is the i-th session at Aˆ, S4 completes the session without computing a session key.
4. SessionStateReveal(s): S4 returns toM the session state of session s. However, if s is the i-th session at Aˆ,
S4 aborts.
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5. SessionKeyReveal(s): S4 returns toM the session key of s. If s is the i-th session at Aˆ, S4 aborts.
6. Corruption(Pˆ ): S4 givesM the handle of the long-term key P . IfM tries to corrupt Aˆ or Bˆ, S4 aborts.
7. H1(), H2(), avf(), and avf
′() are simulated as random oracles in the usual way.
Proof. The probability thatM sets the type of A to be TPM_ALG_ECMQV and selects the i-th session of Aˆ as the
test session is at least 13 ×
1
n2k =
1
3n2k . Suppose that this is indeed the case: the type of A is TPM_ALG_ECMQV, so
S4 does not abort in Step 0;M is not allowed to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ, make SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal
queries to the i-th session of Aˆ, so S4 does not abort in Step 1, 2, 4, 5, 6. Therefore, S4 simulatesM’s environment
perfectly. By the assumption,M correctly guesses the tuple (Z = (Y0B
e)h(x0+da), Aˆ, Bˆ) of the test session where
d = avf(X0) and e = avf(Y0). We now show that (Y0, Z) is a valid forgery against O
MQV
B on input (X0, A) where
X0 is the challenge:
1. (Y0, Z) is a valid return result of O
MQV
B as Z = (Y0B
e)h(x0+da) = (X0A
d)h(y0+eb).
2. We now show that OMQVB never returns the result (Y0, Z) on input (X0, A) under S4:
(a) If the type of B is TPM_ALG_ECDH or TPM_ALG_SM2, OMQVB has never been created by S4.
(b) If the type of B is TPM_ALG_ECMQV, S4 must create O
MQV
B in step 0. However, if O
MQV
B ever
returned the result (Y0, Z) for some Z on input (A,X0), Bˆ must have a session identified by (sc =
TPM_ALG_ECMQV, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y0, X0), which is exactly the matching session of the test session. This
contradicts that the test session has no matching session in these two subcases.
3. SinceM is not allowed to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ,M does not know a and b. SoM does not know the private key
pair (a, x0). Thus,M is under the constraint described in theorem 1.
Finally we get: Pr(M succeeds in forgingOMQVB under S4) ≥
1
3n2kPr(M). 
7.1.3 Analysis of Case 3
The analysis of Case 3 is similar to Case 2. It is easy to get a full proof by following the analysis in Section 7.1.2, so
we omit the analysis of Case 3.
7.2 Infeasibility of Key-replication Attacks
If M successfully launches a key-replication attack against the test session s = (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0), he succeeds
in establishing a session s′ = (sc′, Aˆ′, Bˆ′, X ′, Y ′), which is different than s and (sc, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y0, X0) (the matching
session of s) but has the same key as the test session s. The sc of s′ must fall under one of the following three cases.
By demonstrating that key-replication attacks are impossible in any of the three cases, we prove thatM cannot launch
key-replication attacks.
1. sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH.
2. sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV.
3. sc = TPM_ALG_SM2.
7.2.1 Analysis of Case 1
In this case, the session key of the test session is the value of the random oracle H1() on σ = (Z1, Z2, Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0).
As the session key of the MQV or SM2 key exchange protocol is the value of the random oracleH2() on some 3-tuple
(Z, Aˆ, Bˆ), the session s′ must belong to a party whose long-term key is the type of TPM_ALG_ECDH. So the session
identifier of s′ must be (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0) or (sc, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y0, X0) where sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH, i.e., s
′ is the test
session or its matching session, which contradicts that s′ is different from s and the matching session of s.
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7.2.2 Analysis of Cases 2 and 3
We show that a key-replication attack is impossible by showing that a successful attacker would contradict the GDH
assumption or break the unforgeability of MQV functionality or SM2 key exchange functionality.
Since s′ has the same session key as the test session s, s′ must have the same σ as the test session. In all the subcases
of Case 2 in Section 7.1.2, all the simulators (S2, S3, and S4) provideM with the session state of all exposed sessions.
Therefore,M can obtain the 3-tuple of s by exposing s′ (this is allowed in the security model as s′ is not the matching
session of s). This means thatM is able to launch forging attacks. However, we have shown that ifM succeeds in
a forging attack: S2 would succeed in solving the GDH problem, and under S3 and S4, there would exist an attacker
breaking the unforgeability of the MQV functionality of tpm.KE. By applying the above argument and replacing the
unforgeability of the MQV functionality of tpm.KE with the unforgeability of the SM2 key exchange functionality of
tpm.KE, we directly get the analysis of Case 3.
8 Further Security Properties of tpm.KE
Besides the basic security property defined by modern security models, it is desirable for AKE protocols to achieve the
following two security properties. The key-compromise impersonation (KCI) resistance property: the knowledge of a
party’s long-term private key does not enable the attacker to impersonate other uncorrupted parties to the party. The
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) property: the expired session keys established before the compromise of the long-term
key cannot be recovered.
From the UKS attacks against MQV and SM2 key exchange protocols (A and B) we know that if the attacker is allowed
to obtain the plaintext of the long-term key when he corrupts the corresponding party, these protocols will be unable
to satisfy the basic security property defined by modern AKE security models. So the current version of tpm.KE can
only achieve the security property defined by the security model in case that the attacker cannot obtain the plaintext
of long-term keys (even he corrupts the parties). Since tpm.KE can only be proven secure in situations where the
plaintext of long-term keys cannot be revealed to the attacker, which does not satisfy the definitions of KCI-resistance
and wPFS properties, it cannot provide the KCI-resistance and wPFS properties. But tpm.KE can satisfy weak forms
of the two properties: (1) constrained KCI-resistance; that is, the control of a party’s long-term key handle does not
enable the attacker to impersonate other uncontrolled parties to the party; and (2) the constrained PFS property; that is,
the expired session keys established before the attacker controls the handle of the long-term key cannot be recovered.
To prove the above weak forms of the two properties, all needed is to note that the proof of tpm.KE in Section 7 still
holds if we allow the attacker to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ which are the related parties of the test session, i.e., all the simulators
do not abort when Aˆ and Bˆ are corrupted. The proof remains valid since the abort operations are never used in the
proof.
9 Suggestions on Usage of the Current Version of tpm.KE
Although we formally prove that tpm.KE satisfies the basic security property defined by modern AKE models, this is
achieved under the following conditions: first, all the long-term keys must be generated by the TPM, and the attacker
cannot register arbitrary keys; second, the attacker cannot obtain the plaintext of the long-term key even he corrupts
the party; third, the attacker cannot obtain the unhashed value of the Full UM protocol. These constraints require that
engineers should deploy tpm.KE properly, otherwise tpm.KE would be unable to provide secure communications. In
order to help engineers to use tpm.KE securely, we give the following suggestions:
1. For a network that plans to use tpm.KE to protect its communications, we suggest that all devices in the net-
work should be equipped with the TPM and the CA should only issue certificates for keys that are generated
by the TPM. This requires the CA to check the validity of the TPM, and this can be done by leveraging the
Privacy CA protocol [51] or the direct anonymous attestation (DAA) protocol [52] if higher anonymity is
required.
2. The network administrator should guarantee that all TPM chips are well protected against sophisticated phys-
ical attacks which can obtain the secrets inside the TPM, and the administrator should know that if one TPM
chip is physically broken, the whole network may no longer be secure.
3. The software running on the host which derives the session key from the return results of the TPM should
be well protected. For example, run the software in the secure execution environment provided by the Intel
SGX [53, 54] or ARM TrustZone [7] technologies and delete the return results of the TPM (especially Z1 of
the Full UM protocol) immediately after the session key is derived.
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10 Revision of tpm.KE
A real-world network may contain various kinds of devices, and it is common that some devices are protected by the
TPM and the others are not. Moreover, there exist physical attacks that can access all keys inside the TPM [55]. So it
is hard for real-world networks to satisfy the conditions required to ensure tpm.KE’s security. Therefore, the current
version of tpm.KE puts a significant limitation on its application on real-world networks.
In order to make tpm.KE more applicable to real-world networks, we suggest revising TPM 2.0 specifications as
follows: perform the session key derivation in the TPM rather than on the host, i.e., perform H1() and H2() in the
TPM. The revision only adds a hash computation to the TPM, which is negligible compared to the elliptic curve scalar
multiplication. This revision is inspired by the HMQV protocol, the first proven secure implicitly AKE protocol,
which requires that its unhashed value Z should be stored in the same secure environment as the long-term key and
only the session key is output outside of the environment. We give concrete suggestions on how to revise TPM 2.0
specifications: the only change is to revise TPM2_ZGen_2Phase() command in the TPM 2.0 Command specification
[6]. The command is revised to derive the session key inside the TPM and return the session key, while the original
command returns the unhashed values Z1 and Z2. Figure 3 describes the changes to the input and response of the
TPM2_ZGen_2Phase() command.
• Changes of input: add the identities of the owner and peer of the session.
• Changes of response: not return the unhashed values but the session key.
Type Name
TPM_ST tag
UINT32 responseSize
TPM_RC responseCode
TPM2B_ECC_POINT
TPM2B_ECC_POINT
outZ1
outZ2
Type Name
TPM_ST tag
UINT32 responseSize
TPM_RC responseCode
TPM2B_SYM_KEY sessionKey
Type Name
COMMAND_TAG tag
UINT32 cmdSize
TPM_CC cmdCode
TPM2B_ECC_POINT
TPM2B_ECC_POINT
B
Y
TPMI_DH_OBJECT keyA
KEY_EXCHANGE scheme
UINT16 ctr
TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER identityA
TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER identityB
(a). TPM2_Zgen_2Phase() Input
(b). TPM2_Zgen_2Phase() Response
Figure 3: Revision of TPM2_ZGen_2Phase()
11 Preparation for the Security Analysis of the Revision
In this section, we do the preparationwork for the security analysis of the revision of tpm.KE (denoted by tpm.KE.rev),
including the formal description of tpm.KE.rev, the session state, and the attacker model.
11.1 Formal Description of tpm.KE.rev
The first phase of tpm.KE.rev is the same as tpm.KE, so we use the same ephem()A to model the interface of the first
phase of tpm.KE.rev. As the TPM returns the session key in the second phase of tpm.KE.rev, we modify the oracles
OMQVA andO
SM2
A to return the session key. We get the formal description of tpm.KE.rev by using the modified oracles
OMQVA andO
SM2
A to replace the original oracles of the formal description of tpm.KE in Section 5.
As our formal analysis of tpm.KE.rev contains parties that are not equipped with the TPM, we need to describe how
the protocols are implemented in these parties. These parties also use the Initiate, Respond and Complete activations
to construct protocol sessions. The three activations for these parties differ from the activations for tpm.KE.rev in
that they do not leverage the interfaces of the TPM, i.e., ephem()A, O
EC
A , O
MQV
A , and O
SM2
A , but run following the
specifications of the protocols.
20
A PREPRINT
11.2 Session State
The session state includes the information returned by the TPM. As the ephemeral key and unhashed values (such as
Z1 and Z2) are stored inside the TPM, we specify that the session state only includes the session key.
11.3 Attacker Model for tpm.KE.rev
The attacker model for tpm.KE.rev is used to capture realistic attack capabilities in real-world networks, which are
much stronger than the attack capabilities captured by the model for tpm.KE. In particular, the model for tpm.KE.rev
allows the attacker to register arbitrary keys to the CA and obtain the plaintext of a long-term key by corrupting the
party. To capture the above stronger attack capabilities, we add the EstablishParty query to the model for tpm.KE
(Section 4) and modify the SessionStateReveal and Corruption queries.
• EstablishParty(Pˆ ): this query is newly added to the model to allow the attacker to register a static public
key on behalf of party Pˆ .
• SessionStateReveal(s):M directly queries at session s while still incomplete and learns the session state for
s. The session state only includes the session key, while the session state in the model for tpm.KE includes
the unhashed values.
• Corruption(Pˆ ): this query allows M to learn the plaintext of the long-term private key of party Pˆ , while
this query in the model for tpm.KE only allows the attacker to obtain the black-box access of the long-term
key.
12 Security Analysis of tpm.KE.rev
In order to make our analysis be close to real-world networks as much as possible, we do not make any assumption
whether the parties in the network are equipped with the TPM, including the owner and the peer of the test session.
Theorem 6. Under the GDH assumption, with hash functions H1(), H2(), avf(), and avf
′() modeled as random
oracles, tpm.KE.rev is secure in the unified model.
The proof of the above theorem follows from the definition of secure key exchange protocols and the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 7. If two parties Aˆ and Bˆ complete matching sessions, their session keys are the same.
Lemma 8. Under the GDH assumption, there is no feasible attacker that succeeds in distinguishing the session key
of an unexposed session with non-negligible probability.
The proof of Lemma 7 is the same as Lemma 4, and we focus on the proof of Lemma 8. Let M be any attacker
against tpm.KE.rev. M can launch the forging attack or key-replication attack to distinguish the session key of the
test session from a random value. We will show that if either of the attacks succeed with non-negligible probability,
there exists a solver succeeding in solving the GDH problem with non-negligible probability.
12.1 Infeasibility of Forging Attacks
Let (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0) be the test session for whose tuple M outputs a correct guess. sc can fall under one of the
following three cases:
1. sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH.
2. sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV.
3. sc = TPM_ALG_SM2.
AsM succeeds with non-negligible probability in the forging attack, there is at least one of the above three cases that
occurs with non-negligible probability. We assume thatM operates in an environment that involves at most n parties
and each party participates in at most k sessions. We analyze the three cases separately in the following.
12.1.1 Analysis of Case 1
For this case, we build a GDH solver S5. It takes as input a pair (A,B), creates an experiment which includes n honest
parties and the attackerM, and is given access to a DDH oracle DDH . S5 randomly decides whether each party is
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protected by the TPM or not, randomly selects two parties Aˆ and Bˆ from the honest parties and sets their public keys
to be A and B respectively. All the other parties compute their keys normally. Furthermore, S5 randomly selects an
integer i ∈ [1, ..., k]. The simulation forM’s environment proceeds as follows.
0. S5 models ephemP () following the description in Section 5 for all parties protected by the TPM.M sets the
types of all long-term keys. If the type ofA is not TPM_ALG_ECDH, S5 aborts. S5 creates oracles modeling
the two-phase key exchange functionalities for parties protected by the TPM normally except parties Aˆ and
Bˆ. The procedures ofH1() andH2() are described below. avf() and avf
′() are simulated as random oracles
in the usual way.
1. Initiate(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2): Pˆ1 executes the Initiate() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created
is the i-th session at Aˆ, S5 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If not, S5 aborts.
2. Respond(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Y ): With the exception of Aˆ and Bˆ (whose behaviors we explain below), Pˆ1 executes
the Respond() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created is the i-th session at Aˆ, S5
checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If not, S5 aborts.
3. Complete(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ): With the exception of Aˆ and Bˆ (whose behaviors we explain below), Pˆ1 exe-
cutes the Complete() activation of the protocol. However, if the session is the i-th session at Aˆ, S5 completes
the session without computing a session key.
4. Establish(Pˆ , P ): S5 creates the party Pˆ whose public key is P and marks Pˆ as corrupted.
5. If Aˆ is protected by the TPM, with the input (sc, keyA, ctrx, P, Y ), S5 creates the oracle O
EC
A as follows:
compute the session key k = Hspec(Aˆ, Pˆ ,X, Y ). Hspec() is simulated as a random oracle.
6. Respond(sc, Aˆ, Pˆ , Y ):
(a) If Aˆ is protected by the TPM, S5 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemA() and O
EC
A .
(b) If Aˆ is not protected by the TPM, S5 generates an ephemeral key pair (x,X = g
x), outputs X , and
computes the session key k = Hspec(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
7. Complete(sc, Aˆ, Pˆ ,X, Y ):
(a) If Aˆ is protected by the TPM, S5 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemA() and O
EC
A .
(b) If Aˆ is not protected by the TPM, S5 computes the session key k = Hspec(Aˆ, Pˆ ,X, Y ).
8. If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, with the input (sc, keyB, ctry, P,X), S5 creates the oracle modeling the two-
phase key exchange functionality for party Bˆ: recover the ephemeral key pair (y, Y = gy) by ctry , and
compute the session key k = Hspec(Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X).
9. Respond(sc, Bˆ, Pˆ ,X):
(a) If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, S5 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemB() and the
oracle for Bˆ (Step 8).
(b) If Bˆ is not protected by the TPM, S5 simulates this session activation as follows: generate an ephemeral
key pair (y, Y = gy), output Y , and compute the session key k = Hspec(Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X).
10. Complete(sc, Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X):
(a) If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, S5 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemB() and the
oracle for Bˆ (Step 8).
(b) If Bˆ is not protected by the TPM, S5 sets the session key to be k = Hspec(Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X).
11. SessionStateReveal(s): S5 returns toM the session state of session s. However, if s is the i-th session at Aˆ,
S5 aborts.
12. SessionKeyReveal(s): S5 returns toM the session key of s. If s is the i-th session at Aˆ, S5 aborts.
13. Corruption(Pˆ ): S5 givesM the long-term key pair of Pˆ . IfM tries to corrupt Aˆ or Bˆ, S5 aborts.
14. H1(σ) function for some σ = (Z1, Z2, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) proceeds as follows:
(a) If Pˆ1 = Aˆ, Pˆ2 = Bˆ, andDDH(A,B,Z1) = 1, S5 abortsM and succeeds by outputting CDH(A,B) =
Z1.
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(b) If the value of the function on input σ has been defined previously, return it.
(c) If the value ofHspec() on input (Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) has been defined previously, return it.
(d) Pick a random key k ∈R {0, 1}
λ, and defineH1(σ) = k.
15. H2(σ) function for some σ = (Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) proceeds as follows:
(a) If the value of the function on input σ has been defined previously, return it.
(b) If not defined, go over all the previous calls to Hspec() and for each previous call of the form
Hspec(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) = v proceed as follows according to the type of P1.
i. Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV: check if DDH(XP d1 , Y P
e
2 , Z
1/h) = 1 where d = avf(X) and e =
avf(Y ); if the condition holds, return v.
ii. Case TPM_ALG_SM2: check if DDH(P1X
d, P2Y
e, Z1/h) = 1 where d = avf ′(X) and e =
avf ′(Y ); if the condition holds, return v.
(c) If no previous calls of that form are found, pick a random key w and defineH2(Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = w.
16. Hspec(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) function proceeds as follows:
(a) If the value of the function on that input has been defined previously, return it.
(b) If not defined, proceed as follows according to the type of P1.
i. Case TPM_ALG_ECDH: go over all the previous calls to H1() and for each previous call of the
form H1(Z1, Z2, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) = v check if DDH(P1, P2, Z1) = 1; if the condition holds, return
v.
ii. Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV: go over all the previous calls to H2() and for each previous call of
the form H2(Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = v check if DDH(XP
d
1 , Y P
e
2 , Z
1/h) = 1 where d = avf(X) and
e = avf(Y ); if the condition holds, return v.
iii. Case TPM_ALG_SM2: go over all the previous calls toH2() and for each previous call of the form
H2(Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = v check ifDDH(P1X
d, P2Y
e, Z1/h) = 1where d = avf ′(X) and e = avf ′(Y );
if the condition holds, return v.
(c) If not found, pick a random key w, defineHspec(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) = w.
Proof. The probability thatM sets the type ofA to be TPM_ALG_ECDH and selects the i-th session at Aˆ and the peer
of the test session is party Bˆ is at least 13n2k . Suppose that this indeed the case: the type ofA is TPM_ALG_ECDH, so
S5 does not abort in Step 0;M is not allowed to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ, make SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal
queries to the i-th session at Aˆ, so S5 does not abort in Step 1, 2, 11, 12, 13. Therefore, S5 simulatesM’s environment
perfectly. Thus, ifM wins with non-negligible probability in this case, the success probability of S5 is bounded by
Pr(S5) ≥
1
3n2kPr(M).

12.1.2 Analysis of Case 2
We build a GDH solver S6 for this case. S6 takes as input a pair (X0, B), creates an experiment which includes n
honest parties and the attackerM, and is given access to a DDH oracle DDH . S6 randomly decides whether each
party is protected by the TPM or not, randomly selects a party and sets its public key to be B. All the other parties
compute their keys normally. Furthermore, S6 randomly selects an integer i ∈ [1, ..., k]. The simulation for M’s
environment proceeds as follows.
0. S6 models ephemP () following the description in Section 5 for all parties protected by the TPM. M sets
the types of all long-term keys. If the type of B is not TPM_ALG_ECMQV, S6 aborts. S6 creates oracles
modeling the two-phase key exchange functionalities for parties protected by the TPM normally except Bˆ.
The procedures ofH1() andH2() are described below. avf() and avf
′() are simulated as random oracles in
the usual way.
1. Initiate(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2): Pˆ1 executes the Initiate() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created
is the i-th session at Aˆ, S6 checks whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If so, S6 sets the
ephemeral public key to beX0, else S6 aborts.
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2. Respond(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, Y ): With the exception of Bˆ (whose behaviors we explain below), Pˆ1 executes the
Respond() activation of the protocol. However, if the session being created is the i-th session at Aˆ, S6 checks
whether sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV and Pˆ2 = Bˆ. If so, S6 sets the ephemeral public key to be X0 and does
not compute the session key, else S6 aborts.
3. Complete(sc, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ): With the exception of Bˆ, Pˆ1 executes the Complete() activation of the protocol.
However, if the session is the i-th session at Aˆ, S6 completes the session without computing a session key.
4. Establish(Pˆ , P ): S6 creates the party Pˆ whose public key is P , and marks Pˆ as corrupted.
5. If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, with the input (sc, keyB, ctry, P,X), S6 creates the oracle modeling the two-
phase key exchange functionality for party Bˆ: recover the ephemeral key pair (y, Y = gy) by ctry , and
compute the session key k = Hspec(Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X).
6. Respond(sc, Bˆ, Pˆ ,X):
(a) If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, S6 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemB() and the
oracle for Bˆ (Step 5).
(b) If Bˆ is not protected by the TPM, S6 simulates this session activation as follows: generate an ephemeral
key pair (y, Y = gy), output Y , and compute the session key k = Hspec(Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X).
7. Complete(sc, Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X):
(a) If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, S6 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemB() and the
oracle for Bˆ (Step 5).
(b) If Bˆ is not protected by the TPM, S6 sets the session key to be k = Hspec(Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X).
8. SessionStateReveal(s): S6 returns toM the session state of session s. However, if s is the i-th session at Aˆ
or the matching session of it (if such a session exists), S6 aborts.
9. SessionKeyReveal(s): S6 returns to M the session key of s. If s is the i-th session at Aˆ or the matching
session of it (if such a session exists), S6 aborts.
10. Corruption(Pˆ ): S6 givesM the long-term key pair of Pˆ . IfM tries to corrupt Aˆ or Bˆ, S6 aborts.
11. H1(σ) function for some σ = (Z1, Z2, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) proceeds as follows:
(a) If the value of the function on input σ has been defined previously, return it.
(b) If the value ofHspec() on input (Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) has been defined previously, return it.
(c) Pick a random key k ∈R {0, 1}
λ, and defineH1(σ) = k.
12. H2(σ) function for some σ = (Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) proceeds as follows:
(a) If the value of the function on input σ has been defined previously, return it.
(b) If not defined, go over all the previous calls to Hspec() and for each previous call of the form
Hspec(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) = v proceed as follows according to the type of P1.
i. Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV: check if DDH(XP d1 , Y P
e
2 , Z
1/h) = 1 where d = avf(X) and e =
avf(Y ); if the condition holds, return v.
ii. Case TPM_ALG_SM2: check if DDH(P1X
d, P2Y
e, Z1/h) = 1 where d = avf ′(X) and e =
avf ′(Y ); if the condition holds, return v.
(c) If not found, pick a random key w and defineH2(Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = w.
13. Hspec(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) function proceeds as follows:
(a) If the value of the function on that input has been defined previously, return it.
(b) If not defined, proceed as follows according to the type of P1.
i. Case TPM_ALG_ECDH: go over all the previous calls to H1() and for each previous call of the
form H1(Z1, Z2, Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) = v check if DDH(P1, P2, Z1) = 1; if the condition holds, return
v.
ii. Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV: go over all the previous calls to H2() and for each previous call of
the form H2(Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = v check if DDH(XP
d
1 , Y P
e
2 , Z
1/h) = 1 where d = avf(X) and
e = avf(Y ); if the condition holds, return v.
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iii. Case TPM_ALG_SM2: go over all the previous calls toH2() and for each previous call of the form
H2(Z, Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = v check ifDDH(P1X
d, P2Y
e, Z1/h) = 1where d = avf ′(X) and e = avf ′(Y );
if the condition holds, return v.
(c) If not found, pick a random key w and defineHspec(Pˆ1, Pˆ2, X, Y ) = w.
Proof. The probability thatM sets the type of A to be TPM_ALG_ECMQV and selects the i-th session at Aˆ as the
test session is at least 13 ×
1
n2k =
1
3n2k . Suppose that this is indeed the case: the type of A is TPM_ALG_ECMQV, so
S6 does not abort in Step 0;M is not allowed to corrupt Aˆ and Bˆ, make SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal
queries to the i-th session at Aˆ or its matching session (if such a session exists), so S6 does not abort in Step 1, 2, 8,
9, 10. Therefore, S6 simulates M’s environment perfectly. If M wins the forging attack, he computes the 3-tuple
(Z, Aˆ, Bˆ). Without the knowledge of the private key y of Y , S6 is unable to compute CDH(X0, B). S6 computes
T = Z
1/h
BaY ae0
where d = avf(X0) and e = avf(Y0).
Following the Forking Lemma [50] approach, S6 runs M on the same input and same coin flips but with carefully
modified answers to the avf() queries. Note thatM must have queried avf(Y0) in its first run because otherwiseM
would be unable to compute Z of the test session. For the second run of M, S6 responds to avf(Y0) with a value
e′ 6= e selected uniformly at random. IfM succeeds in the second run, S6 computes T
′ = Z
1/h
BaY ae
′
0
. And thereafter
S6 computes CDH(X0, B) = (T
′/T )e−e
′
. Thus, ifM wins with non-negligible probability in this case, the success
probability of S6 is bounded by:
Pr(S6) ≥
C
3n2kPr(M)
where C is a constant arising from the use of the Forking Lemma. 
12.1.3 Analysis of Case 3
The analysis of Case 3 is similar to Case 2. It is easy to get a full proof by following the analysis in Section 12.1.2, so
we omit the analysis of Case 3.
12.2 Infeasibility of Key-replication Attacks
If M successfully launches a key-replication attack against the test session s = (sc, Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0), he succeeds
in establishing a session s′ = (sc′, Aˆ′, Bˆ′, X ′, Y ′), which is different than s and (sc, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y0, X0) (the matching
session of s) but has the same key as the test session s. The sc of s′ must fall under one of the following three cases.
By demonstrating that key-replication attacks are impossible in any of the three cases, we prove thatM cannot launch
key-replication attacks.
1. sc = TPM_ALG_ECDH.
2. sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV.
3. sc = TPM_ALG_SM2.
12.2.1 Analysis of Case 1
The analysis of this case is the same as the analysis in Section 7.2.1 for tpm.KE.
12.2.2 Analysis of Case 2
We prove that key-replication attacks are impossible in this case by showing that a successful key-replication attack
would allow the attacker to launch forging attacks, contradicting the GDH assumption. We build a GDH solver S7 for
this case. S7 takes as input a pair (X0, B), simulates a similar environment forM as S6 does (Section 12.1.2) except
the simulation of session activations at Bˆ and the SessionStateReveal query.
• If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, S7 models ephemB() andO
MQV
B as follows:
– S7 creates a Table T and models ephemB() as follows.
1. Randomly choose e, s ∈ Zq .
2. Set Y = gs/Be and e = avf(Y ).
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3. Randomly choose an index ctr, and add a record (ctr, e, s, Y,−) to T .
4. Return ctr and Y .
– With the input (sc, keyB, ctry, P,X), S7 modelsO
MQV
B as follows:
1. Check whether (1) sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV, (2) P andX are on the curve associated with B, and
(3) the last element of the record in T indexed by ctry is ‘−’. If the above checks succeed, continue,
else return an error.
2. Suppose the entry in T indexed by ctry is (ctry , e, s, Y,−), set Z1 = (XP
d)hs where d = avf(X),
and set the last element of the entry to be ×.
3. Compute the session key k = H2(Z1, Bˆ, Pˆ ), and return k.
• Initiate(sc, Bˆ, Pˆ ):
– If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, S7 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemB().
– If Bˆ is not protected by the TPM, S7 simulates this session activation as follows with the help of a Table
T ′:
1. Randomly choose e, s ∈ Zq .
2. Set Y = gs/Be and e = avf(Y ).
3. Add an entry (e, s, Y,−) to T ′.
4. Output Y .
• Respond(sc, Bˆ, Pˆ ,X):
1. If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, S7 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemB() andO
MQV
B .
2. If Bˆ is not protected by the TPM, S7 simulates this session activation as follows:
(a) Randomly choose e, s ∈ Zq .
(b) Set Y = gs/Be and e = avf(Y ).
(c) Compute Z1 = (XP
d)hs where d = avf(X).
(d) Output Y , and compute the session key k = H2(Z1, Bˆ, Pˆ ).
• Complete(sc, Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X):
1. If Bˆ is protected by the TPM, S7 simulates this session activation with the help of ephemB() andO
MQV
B .
2. If Bˆ is not protected by the TPM, S7 proceeds as follows:
(a) Check whether (1) sc = TPM_ALG_ECMQV, (2) P andX are on the curve associated with B, and
(3) the last element of the record in T ′ indexed by Y is ‘−’. If the above checks succeed, continue,
else return an error.
(b) Suppose the entry in T ′ indexed by Y is (e, s, Y,−), set Z1 = (XP
d)hs where d = avf(X), set the
last element of the entry to be ×, and compute the session key k = H2(Z1, Bˆ, Pˆ ).
• SessionStateReveal(s): S7 returnsM the session key of s. Besides, S7 also returns the 3-tuple σ = (Z −
1, Pˆ1, Pˆ2). The reason that S7 can return the 3-tuple σ of s toM is that in the above simulation of session
activations at Bˆ, we compute the 3-tuple σ of each session, and for other parties, S7 is also able to compute
the 3-tuple σ of each session.
Proof. As S7 providesM with the 3-tuple σ of all exposed sessions, M can query s
′ to obtain the 3-tuple σ′ of s′
which equals σ of the test session s. This means that M successfully gets the 3-tuple of the test session s without
exposing s or its matching session, namely,M can launch the forging attack. We have proved that ifM can launch
forging attacks, we can build a GDH solver S6. So S7 can leverage S6 to solve the CDH problem: CDH(X0, B) =
S6(X0, B). 
12.2.3 Analysis of Case 3
The analysis of Case 3 is similar to Case 2, and it can be easily completed following the analysis of Case 2.
13 Further Security Properties of tpm.KE.rev
In this section, we analyze the KCI-resistance and weak PFS (wPFS) security properties of tpm.KE.rev.
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13.1 Resistance to KCI Attacks
The KCI-resistance propertymeans that even if the attackerM has obtained the long-term key of party Aˆ, he cannot im-
personate other parties to Aˆ. We show that the Full UM protocol cannot achieve this security property by the following
attack:M generates an ephemeral key pair (y, Y = gy) and initiates a session with Aˆ as the identity of Bˆ; after receiv-
ing Y , Aˆ generates its ephemeral key pair (x,X = gx) and computes its session key k = H1(B
a, Y x, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y );
M can also compute the session key of Aˆ: k = H1(B
a, Xy, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ). We now prove that the MQV and SM2 key
exchange protocols of tpm.KE.rev can achieve the KCI-resistance property.
Lemma 9. Under the GDH assumption, the MQV and SM2 key exchange protocols of tpm.KE.rev resist KCI attacks.
Proof. Lemma 9 can be easily proved by slightly modifying the proof of MQV and SM2 key exchange protocols in
Section 12. The only change to the proof in Section 12 is that all GDH solvers used to prove the security of MQV
and SM2 key exchange protocols do not abort whenM corrupts Aˆ. The proof remains valid because the above abort
operations are not used in the proof (we add the abort of GDH solvers when Aˆ is corrupted for compliance with the
notion of the session exposure in the security model). 
13.2 Weak Perfect Forward Secrecy
Hrawczyk has proved that the implicitly AKE protocols cannot achieve the full PFS property and can only achieve
weak PFS [17]: only the session keys that are established without the active involvement of the attacker enjoy PFS
property.
Lemma 10. Under the CDH assumption, tpm.KE.rev provides weak PFS.
Proof. Here we only outline the idea of the proof of Lemma 10, and the full proof can be completed following the
proof in Section 12. We construct a CDH solver S8 ifM successfully breaks the weak PFS security property. Let X
and Y be the inputs to S8, and the goal of S8 is to compute CDH(X,Y ). S8 simulates the environment forM as
follows: it sets all parties’ long-term keys and chooses a random guess for the test session of the distinguishing game.
We call the guessed session the g-session, denote the owner and the peer of the test session by Aˆ and Bˆ respectively,
and denote their long-term private keys by a and b, respectively. S8 sets the incoming and outgoing messages in the
g-session to be X and Y . IfM does choose the g-session as the test session and wins the distinguish game, he must
compute the tuple σ of the test session in his run. We proceed to show that no matter what the type of A is, S8 can
compute CDH(X,Y ), i.e., gxy.
1. Case TPM_ALG_ECDH: σ equals (Z1, Z2, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) where Z2 = g
xy.
2. Case TPM_ALG_ECMQV: σ equals (Z, Aˆ, Bˆ) where Z = gh(x+da)(y+eb); since S8 knows a and b, he can
compute gxy.
3. Case TPM_ALG_SM2: σ equals (Z, Aˆ, Bˆ) where Z = gh(a+dx)(b+ey); since S8 knows a and b, he can
compute gxy.

14 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a formal analysis of the secure communication interfaces of TPM 2.0 in a unified way. We
construct a security model which takes account of the protections of the TPM on keys and protocols’ computation
environments and eliminates group representation attacks existing in theory by measuring the entropy of the output of
the avf() and avf ′() functions. The analysis results show that the current version of the key exchange primitive in
TPM 2.0 can achieve the basic security property of modern security models, but its security is achieved under some
impractical conditions: all devices in the network should be protected by the TPM, and security measures should
be deployed to prevent sophisticated physical attacks, which can be used by attackers to obtain keys inside the TPM.
Besides, the analysis results also show that the current version of the key exchange primitive in TPM 2.0 cannot achieve
other security properties, such as KCI-resistance and weak PFS properties. We also give suggestions to engineers on
how to use the key exchange primitive of TPM to implement key exchange protocols securely.
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To eliminate the impractical conditions required by the TPM 2.0, we revise the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0 and
give a rigorous analysis of the revision. The analysis results show that our revision helps the key exchange primitive
of TPM 2.0 not only enjoy the essential security property defined by modern AKE models in real-world networks but
also achieve additional security properties: the MQV and SM2 key exchange protocols of TPM 2.0 enjoy the KCI-
resistance property, and all the three protocols of TPM 2.0 enjoy the weak PFS property. Our revision only needs to
modify one TPM command, and we give concrete suggestions on how to revise the TPM 2.0 specifications.
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A Kaliski’s UKS attack
We describe Kaliski’s UKS attack here to show how the attackerM successfully mounts the attack by cleverly com-
puting its long-term private key c and the ephemeral public keyX ′.
1. Aˆ sends an ephemeral public keyX to Bˆ.
2. M interceptsX .
3. M registers to the CA a key C = gc where c is cleverly computed by the following steps:
(a) Choose u ∈R Zq;
(b) Compute d = avf(X),X ′ = XAdg−u, e = avf(X ′), and c = u/e.
4. M sends X ′ to Bˆ as the identity ofM.
5. M relays the ephemeral key Y from Bˆ to Aˆ.
Note thatX ′Ce = XAd, and therefore the keys computed in sessions (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) and (Bˆ,M, Y,X ′) are identical.
B Xu’s attacks
Here we describe Xu’s two attacks on the SM2 key exchange protocol to show that in the first attack the attacker,M
needs to register a specific long-term public key, and in the second attack, M needs to use the private key of Aˆ to
perform some computations.
B.1 Attack I
M selects u ∈R Zq, and registers a carefully computed public keyM = Ag
u.
1. Aˆ sends an ephemeral public keyX to Bˆ.
2. M interceptsX and sends it to Bˆ as the identity ofM.
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3. Bˆ sends its ephemeral public key Y to M, and computes ZB = (MX
d)h(b+ey) where d = avf ′(X) and
e = avf ′(Y ).
4. M forwards Y to Aˆ as the identity of Bˆ. Aˆ computes ZA = (BY
e)h(a+dx).
5. M corrupts ZB of session (Bˆ,M, Y,X), and then M can compute ZA of session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ): ZA =
ZB/(BY
e)hu, andM further derives the session key of (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
Note that the above attack shows that the corruption of session (Bˆ,M, Y,X) does affect the security of session
(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ), so the SM2 key exchange protocol cannot achieve the security defined by modern AKE security models.
B.2 Attack II
M first registers a legal keyM = gm.
1. Aˆ sends an ephemeral public keyX to Bˆ.
2. M interceptsX and sendsX ′ = AXd (d = avf ′(X)) to Bˆ as the identity ofM.
3. Bˆ sends an ephemeral public key Y toM and computes ZB = (MX
′d′)h(b+ey) where d′ = avf ′(X ′) and
e = avf ′(Y ).
4. M forwards it to Aˆ. Aˆ computes ZA = (BY
e)h(a+dx) where d = avf ′(X) and e = avf ′(Y ).
5. M corrupts ZB of session (Bˆ,M, Y,X
′), computes ZA of session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ): ZA =
(ZA/(BY
e)hm)d
′−1
, and further derives the session key of (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
C Group Representation Attack on MQV
For the benefit of the reader, we present the group representation attack on MQV here. Consider such a group G that
the representations of its elements satisfy that the ⌈q/2⌉ LSBs of the representation of points’ x-coordinate are fixed.
We use c to denote the fixed value. In this case, the Z value of MQV becomes Z = gh(x+ca)(y+cb). The attackerM
can launch the following attack:
1. M randomly chooses x∗ ∈R Zq and computesX
∗ = gx
∗
/Ac.
2. M sends X∗ to Bˆ as the identity of Aˆ.
3. Bˆ responds with Y = gy , computes Z = (X∗Ac)h(y+cb), and computes its session keyK = H2(Z, Aˆ, Bˆ).
4. M can also compute the session keyK = H2((Y B
c)hx
∗
, Aˆ, Bˆ).
The above attack shows that M can impersonate Aˆ without knowing the private key of Aˆ because of the special
representations of the group elements.
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